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abstract 
The vulnerability/resilience nexus that defined the interaction between developing and 
advanced economies in the post-WWII era is undergoing a fundamental transformation. 
The aim of the paper is to analyse the nature of this transformation and its impact on 
the role and place of Emerging and Developing Countries (EDCs) in the global 
economy. The current debate is dominated by two approaches: on the one hand 
econometric studies that examine the decoupling hypothesis, and on the other structural 
explanations that are focusing on the dominant role of the US. The paper attempts to 
advance this debate by focusing on the EDCs agency and in particular their resilience-
enhancing policies. We conclude that the EDCs 'new resilience' and the conditions of 
‘systemic interlocking’ that currently define the relations between emerging powers and 
advanced economies, increase the EDCs leverage and policy space in the global 
economy. Furthermore, although a new series of EDCs crises cannot be ruled out (for 
instance as a result of monetary tightening in the US), their potential global economic 
and geoeconomic consequences make them too dangerous an outcome for advanced 
economies. 
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The New Resilience of Emerging and Developing Countries:  
Systemic Interlocking, Currency Swaps and Geoeconomics   
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The emerging and developing countries (EDCs)1 demonstrated unexpected resilience 
in the face of global economic crisis, especially in comparison to past global 
recessions2. There have not been generalized currency-collapses, bank insolvencies, 
and social unrest. On the contrary, it was the first time in modern history that EDCs, 
especially emerging powers, not only demonstrated strong capacity to use stabilizing 
economic/fiscal stimuli3, but also bailed out the advanced economies4. Thus massive 
amounts of money moved, mostly through sovereign wealth funds, from EDCs to 
advanced economies, offering critical support for the recapitalization of leading 
western banks and corporations, such as the UBS, Citigroup, Deutsche Bank, Barclays, 
Merrill Lynch, Morgan Stanley, HSBC, Credit Suisse, VISA Inc., Bear Stearns, 
Blackstone Group, Carlyle Group, Standard Chartered Bank, London Stock Exchange, 
Nasdaq, and Daimler5.  
 
The aim of this paper is to analyse the sources and the dynamics that govern this ‘new 
resilience’ of emerging and developing countries. Resilience is a relative not an 
absolute quality. The resilience demonstrated by the emerging and developing 
countries, does not mean that these countries do not remain vulnerable to economic 
trends and changes taking place in the advanced economies. It indicates, however, that 
the degree of this vulnerability and the way it functions may have changed. In this 
context, the paper examines the factors that underlie this new resilience of the 
developing world, the ‘degrees of freedom’ that this new resilience may create for the 
emerging powers of the global South, and the broader geoeconomic implications of 
these developments. 
 
In the paper, resilience is conceptualised as the ability of the EDCs to deal with external 
economic shocks (e.g. the 2008/09 global economic crisis, or monetary tightening in 
the US), and persistent adverse international economic conditions (e.g. a prolonged 
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period of low growth or high interest rates in advanced economies)6. The EDCs’ 
resilience may increase or decrease as a result of domestic economic conditions and 
policies, the frequency, duration and intensity of the adverse external developments, as 
well as broader changes in the global distribution of power and wealth. Resilience is 
not and cannot be captured and analysed just as a set of economic indicators (e.g. GDP 
growth, debt exposure). The ability of the EDCs to endure external volatility, crises and 
shocks, is also determined by the wider structure of the global political economy, and 
the way in which (different) EDCs are integrated in it. It is this mode of integration that 
determines the nature and degree of exposure and the vulnerabilities experienced by the 
EDCs in the global economy, as well as the parameters, effectiveness and limits of their 
resilience-related policies and strategies. This analysis has traditionally focused on 
factors such as the EDCs degree of economic openness, export concertation, and 
dependence on strategic imports7, as well as their inability to borrow abroad in their 
own currency, manage external debt levels that are considered sustainable in advanced 
economies, and deal with currency mismatch problems in their balance sheets8. To 
capture this embedded approach to resilience, the paper advances the concept of 
‘vulnerability/resilience nexus’. The concept of nexus aims to signify the dynamic 
nature of the interaction between vulnerability structures and resilience strategies, and 
the multiple points of ‘equilibrium’ and possibilities for transformation generated by 
this interaction. In this context, our aim in this paper is not only to account for the 
factors that underlie the resilience demonstrated by the EDCs, but also to examine 
whether and how current EDCs policies have the ability to challenge the very 
vulnerability structure within which this resilience operates. Such challenges would 
rather signify a transformation of the ‘resilience capacity’ of EDCs, rather than just an 
increase in their ‘ability to endure’ external crises.     
 
There have recently been a number of important challenges in the traditional literature 
on EDCs. Despite modest growth in advanced economies, the EDCs demonstrated 
impressive growth rates over the last decade. This threw the traditional EDCs 
vulnerability/resilience nexus into sharp relief, and questioned the ‘conventional 
wisdom that when the US economy sneezes the rest of the world catches a cold’9. As a 
result there has been a new wave of econometric studies examining the decoupling 
hypothesis, i.e. whether the divergence in the business cycles of the advanced and 
emerging economies, and the increased trade and financial integration among the 
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emerging economies, have made the EDCs less dependent on and vulnerable to 
advanced economies. The findings of these studies have been inconclusive, with some 
authors finding evidence in favour of the decoupling thesis10, others pointing to exactly 
the opposite direction of recoupling and increased interdependence11, and some 
referring to decoupling in terms of business cycles but recoupling in terms of financial 
markets12. Yet, this de/recoupling literature offers us a rather structural perspective on 
the EDCs’ place in the global economy. Put differently, it tell us very few things on 
what is actually happening on the ground, in terms of new power configurations and 
institutional arrangements, and how these developments may impact on and transform 
the EDCs vulnerability/resilience. Therefore, despite its contribution in terms of new 
insights on the relationship between EDCs and advanced economies, this new wave of 
studies suffers from the ‘structural bias’ found also in traditional studies that have 
focused on the dominant role of the US and the US dollar in the global economy. 
 
Another wave of literature has attempted to avoid this ‘structural bias’ by developing 
an agent-centric perspective13. Eric Helleiner for instance offers a compelling account 
of the global economic crisis as a status quo enhancing event, through which the US 
and US dollar maintained, if not strengthened, their dominant role in the global 
economy. His analysis demonstrates the failure of emerging powers to challenge the 
existing structures of global governance. Yet, a systematic account of initiatives and 
changes related to the EDCs resilience capacity and how these may matter remains 
beyond the scope of his analysis14. On this, Kevin Gallagher’s research on EDCs capital 
controls related policies is illuminating. Gallagher demonstrates how the combination 
of the EDCs new resilience with new economic thinking and institutional dynamics can 
challenge on the ground key aspects of the EDCs traditional vulnerability/resilience 
nexus15. Similarly, Mikko Huotari and Thilo Hanemann assess the increased capacity 
of the BRIC countries to challenge the parameters of the global economic system16, and  
Leslie Armijo and Saori Katada demonstrate how the recent changes in the capabilities 
of emerging powers have increased the economic and financial instruments that these 
countries have available to achieve their foreign policy goals17. From a different 
perspective but with similar aims Gregory Chin has assessed the limits of EDCs 
regional financing initiatives18, and Adriana Abdenur and Maiara Folly have examined 
the degree of institutionalization of the BRICS, through an assessment of their New 
Development Bank19. 
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This paper attempts to advance the above literature by offering one of the first 
systematic assessments on how dispersed resilience-related sources and arrangements 
are coming together to challenge (or not) the EDCs traditional vulnerability/resilience 
nexus. Literature on this issue remains limited. It is not only that we do not have many 
studies, for instance on new regional financing arrangements, bilateral currency swaps 
agreements, and the use of local currencies in trade and finance. It is also, and maybe 
more important, that there are no many systematic efforts that attempt to conceptualize 
how these different activities are interrelated, and to what effect. We do not know 
enough about a wide range of new disperse mechanisms and practices that increase the 
resilience of EDCs, we know even less about how these disperse mechanisms and 
practices come together and interact in ways that (may) redefine the way the traditional 
vulnerability/resilience nexus operates. Filling this gap requires moving beyond 
structural explanations, formal economic vulnerability indicators, and changes in the 
Bretton Woods institutions. It requires focusing on the interacting agency of emerging 
powers themselves, i.e. what is going on ‘on the ground’ rather than just the manifested 
impact of this agency on formal multilateral structures of governance (e.g. attempted 
changes in voting power in IMF). In this context, our aim in this paper is to examine 
what ‘resilience capacity’ is generated by an emergent network of dispersed but 
interlocking arrangements and practices produced by the EDCs themselves.        
 
 
The intellectual puzzle of EDCs new resilience 
 
The global economic crisis that followed the 2007 subprime crisis in the US led to a 
rapid global rebalancing between the advanced and emerging/developing economies. 
In 2006 the emerging and developing countries ran a large current account surplus of 
4.9% of their GDP. The same year advanced economies ran a current account deficit of 
1.2% of their GDP. By 2009 the surplus of EDCs had been reduced to 1.4%, while the 
deficit of advanced economies had been reduced to 0.14%. The stiff curve of this 
rebalancing, apparent in Table 1, relates both to a change in the exchange rates and to 
a fall in consumption in the advanced economies. That is, it had to do both with less 
imports and more exports on the side of the deficit advanced economies.  
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TABLE 1 
 
Source: IMF, 2014 
 
Considering the abrupt nature and the magnitude of this significant ‘global 
readjustment’, one would expect growth in the EDCs to collapse. Yet, although the 
EDCs growth rates were negatively affected, they did not follow the collapse we saw 
in the advanced economies. On the contrary, the growth rate difference between the 
two groups of countries, observed after 2000, was maintained (see Table 2). In this way, 
rather than collapsing after the outbreak of the crisis, emerging and developing 
countries acted as the main drivers of global growth, accounting for two thirds of this 
growth from 2010 onwards20. In the period 2007-2013, the advanced economies 
registered on average an annual growth rate of 1.0% (the figure for G7 was even lower 
at 0.8%) whereas the respective figure for the emerging and developing economies was 
5.9% 21.  
 
TABLE 2 
 
Source: IMF, 2015 
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The broader historical-economic context of the aforementioned global current account 
readjustment and growth trends is even more striking (Table 3a). Measured in 
purchasing power parity (PPP), in 1990, advanced and developing economies 
contributed to global GDP 64% and 36% respectively. In 2000, this gap had been 
reduced to 57% vs. 43%. The year 2008 was the first year that the EDCs’ contribution 
to global GDP exceeded that of the developed economies (51% for the developing 
countries). By 2013, this gap in favour of the EDCs, had been widened to 56% vs. 
44%22. Furthermore, according to IMF estimates, 2014 will be the first year that in PPP 
terms China will overtake the US as the largest economy of the world, a trend that is 
projected to continue thereafter (Table 3b)23.  
 
TABLE 3 
 
 
Source: IMF, 2015 
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Despite the fact that economic size does not tell us anything about absolute or relative 
levels of poverty, the above evidence points clearly to a long-term historical 
transformation: a rebalancing of the global economy on the basis of the growing weight 
of emerging and developing countries. Taking into consideration that China and India 
were the largest economies in the world for most of the pre mid- 19th century period, 
such a rebalancing seems a return to ‘normality’ rather than a historical aberration24. 
This does not mean that this trend cannot be reversed. It means, however, that a peaceful 
reversal, if it were to take place, it would take time and effort from the side of advanced 
economies. It would also have to take place in a difficult debt context for advanced 
economies25, as their average public debt is projected to remain above 100% of their 
GDP until 2020 (Table 4) (the respective figure for G7 is even higher at 114%).  
 
TABLE 4 
 
Source: IMF, 2015. Note: vertical lines indicate year 2008 
 
The context of indebtedness in which most G7 economies find themselves becomes 
more striking if in addition to public debt we account for the debt of non-financial 
corporations and households. In mid-2014 the G7 ‘real economy debt’ (i.e. government, 
corporations, households) was on average 261% of their GDP (only Germany was 
below 220%, while Japan was at 400%)26, demonstrating that the majority of these 
economies remain highly leveraged, almost eight years after the break out of the global 
economic crisis27.  
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This increased indebtedness is indicative of the limited policy space available to the 
advanced economies in the post 2008 crisis period. But more importantly, the 
aforementioned historical rebalancing of the global economy in favour of the EDCs 
points to a transformation of the very context that defined the EDCs post-WWII 
conditions of vulnerability and resilience. In particular, the EDCs’ increased 
contribution to global GDP, signifies the transformation of emerging powers into 
‘systemically important’ global actors. This is clearly the case for China but to a lesser 
degree applies to all BRIC countries. The concept of ‘systemically important’ denotes 
that any significant changes in these economies has an impact on the global economy 
as a whole. In this sense, the stability/instability of these countries influences the 
stability/instability of global economy, to a degree higher than any other time in the 
post WWII period. Thus, a major crisis in China is bound to have a major impact on 
the global economy, in the same way (but not necessarily to the same degree and 
through the same channels) that a crisis in the US economy impacts on the rest of the 
world28. Therefore, in the current fragile global economic recovery period, and in a 
context where the EDCs contribute more than half to global GDP in PPP prices (one 
third in current prices), the economic sustainability of advanced and emerging 
economies are causally related (even if there are lags  in the transmission of shocks 
among them). This fundamentally transforms the role and impact of the EDCs in the 
global economy. The current slowdown of growth rates in EDCs should be read in this 
light. The emerging economies could not continue to grow fast, while growth remained 
subdued in advanced economies. But, the opposite is also true now, i.e. any recovery in 
the advanced economies will not be sustainable in a global environment characterized 
by the collapse of EDCs. These conditions of ‘systemic interlocking’ increase the EDCs 
leverage in the global economy, but most importantly changes the very structure in 
which the EDCs vulnerability/resilience nexus traditionally operated. Thus, whereas in 
the past a crisis in EDCs was a peripheral event mostly constrained within EDCs, in the 
current context a crisis in EDCs is bound to have global repercussions, affecting if not 
derailing the fragile recovery of advanced economies. This does not only help us to 
understand the new global economic chessboard that defines the interplay between the 
advanced economies and EDCs, but also problematizes a traditional zero-sum approach 
to economic growth between the EDCs and advanced economies. Yet, as mentioned 
above, to assess the transformation of the EDCs new resilience we need to combine this 
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‘new context’ with concrete resilience policies and strategies. This is the aim of the next 
section. 
 
The 1997/98 Asian Crisis as a geoeconomic moment 
 
The turning point for the emergence of EDCs new resilience was the 1997/98 Asian 
economic crisis and the subsequent global domino of financial crises29. The experience 
of going through an IMF-led socially devastating structural adjustment process (and a 
humiliating global media blitz on the ‘corrupted’ foundations of their socio-economic 
systems’) had a formative impact on publics and elites in the global South. It indeed led 
to a rupture in the mode of integration of large emerging and developing economies in 
the global economy, by forcing them to adopt a ‘self-insure’ strategy against the 
speculative nature of global finance30. Two critical and interrelated elements stand out 
here.  
 
First, the strategy of primary budget surpluses and foreign reserves accumulation. The 
examples of Russia and Brazil are indicative. Russia ran on average a primary budget 
surplus of 5.6% for the period 1999-2006, and 2% for the period 2007-2014 (i.e. before 
and after the global economic crisis); while the primary budget surplus average for the 
period 1999-2014 was 3% of GDP. Similarly, Brazil run a primary budget surplus each 
and every year during the period 2001-2013, which on average was 2.9% of its GDP31. 
The difference in this regard between EDCs and advanced economies is clearly 
reflected in Table 5.   
 
TABLE 5 
 
Source: IMF statistics 2015 
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Respectively, the EDCs international reserves skyrocketed after the late 1990s. The 
2005 was the first year that the EDCs international reserves exceeded that of advanced 
economies, and the gap between the international reserves of these two groups of 
countries kept increasing up to 201332. It is indicative that on average, for all developing 
countries, international reserves increased as a percentage of external debt from 30% in 
2000 to 110% in 2008, and despite the economic crisis they kept increasing up to 2010 
when they peaked at 120.5%. Since then they have registered minor annual reductions 
remaining however above 111% in 201333 (Table 6). 
 
TABLE 6 
6a. Total Foreign Exchange Reserves (excluding gold), US$ billion 
 
 
Source: IMF Statistics 2015  
Note: 2015 refers to January data only 
6b. International Reserves  (% External Debt) 
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Of course the strategies of primary surpluses and reserves accumulation have a very 
high economic and social cost34. Yet, the buffers created by the EDCs acted as 
resilience multiplier at different levels. For instance, ruling out currency attacks, 
attracting capital flows, improving economic ratings, and in general boosting the global 
markets confidence in EDCs economies. 
 
Second, the strategy of reducing external exposure, by achieving a significant reduction 
in external debt35. In particular, the EDCs’ total external debt as a percentage of GDP 
was reduced on average from its Asian crisis peak of 40% in 1999 to 26% in 201336. 
Similarly, total external debt as a percentage of exports –an indicator that better 
captures the vulnerability of the external position of a country—was more than halved, 
from a peak of 164% in 1998 to a low of 70% in 2008, raising again to 84% in 201337 
(Table 7). 
 
TABLE 7 
 
Source: IMF Outlook October 2014 
 
Source: WB, 2015 and Central Bank of Russia, 2015. Note: For Russia, it is % GDP (not GNI) 
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Taking into consideration the collapse in global trade that followed the global financial 
crisis, especially in 2009, the resilience demonstrated by the EDCs is indeed 
remarkable. Remarkable is also the contrast between the EDCs and high-income 
countries whose external debt as a percentage of GDP rose to 142% in 201338. 
 
Furthermore, from the 1999 onwards, we see a rupture in the direction of global 
financial flows. After registering a record surplus of US $140.5 billion in 1998, the 
advanced economies started to register deficits, and the EDCs surpluses in their 
financial accounts. The EDCs continued to register surpluses throughout the period 
2000-2013, leading to a cumulative surplus amount of $3.4 trillion, over the period 
2000-2013. The same period, the cumulative deficit in the advanced economies was 
$3.3 trillion39 (see Table 8a). To get a better sense of what these changes in financial 
flows mean, and how they may affect the EDCs’ resilience in the post-crisis 
environment, let us break down these aggregate amounts into direct investments, 
portfolio investments, and ‘other investments’.   
 
The picture that emerges from this break down is instructive40. First, in terms of short 
term capital flows there is a US$ 252.6 billion of portfolio type investments and 389 
billion of ‘other investments’ (which relate to bank deposits and loans) to the EDCs 
during the period 2000-2006 (Table 8b & 8c). Therefore, during this period, EDCs 
emerge as a critical ‘asset class’ in advanced economies investment portfolios. At the 
same time, this trend, boosted EDCs growth rates helping them to boost their resilience 
in the ways we discussed above (reduced debt, increased foreign reserves). The 2007 
subprime crisis in the US and the collapse of the Lehman Brothers in 2008 produced 
global market panics that triggered abrupt capital outflows from the EDCs back to the 
core i.e. advanced economies. Yet, when investors realised that the uncertainty and 
problems were much larger in the core / advanced economies than in the periphery / 
EDCs, abrupt reversals of flows in favour of EDCs took place. Thus, in terms of short 
term capital, an US$ 181.3 billion of net inflows in EDCs in 2006, was followed by a 
net outflow of 198.6 billion in 2007, followed by 366.2 billion of net inflows in 2008, 
followed by net outflows in 2009 and 2010, and inflows in 2011 and 2012, and 
significant outflows in 2015 (see Table 8d). We analyse this destabilising capital flow 
pattern and its implications below, but clearly, despite panics and abrupt reversals, 
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global capital markets look at EDCs as a credible investment alternative to the fragile 
financial conditions in advanced economies41. It is also worth pointing out that the fact 
that many EDCs had shifted from policies of fixed exchange rates to flexible exchange 
rates, before the outbreak of the crisis, increased their ability to weather through the 
initial shock of these abrupt capital flow reversals42.  
 
Second, the capital flows with regard to long-term direct investments (FDI) follow the 
opposite direction to that of short term flows. The dominant picture here is that of 
outwards flows from the EDCs. Throughout the 2000s, the EDCs engaged in 
acquisition of assets abroad (including in the advanced economies), a trend that is 
peaking up as we get closer to the subprime crisis in the US43. This trend is intensified 
during the first years of the crisis, with peaks in 2008 and 2011. During the period 2000-
2008 EDCs outwards FDI flows reached US$ 2.3 trillion, followed by 2.2 trillion during 
2009-2013 (Table 8e).  Yet, at the same time an interesting reverse trend had been 
taking place.   
 
In the same way that parent financial and non-financial corporations in the advanced 
economies withdraw sources and operations from the EDCs to support their core 
operations in their home countries, parent financial and non-financial corporations in 
the EDCs started to do the same by withdrawing resources and operations abroad to 
support their operations at home. As Jara et al 44 note for Latin America, one difference 
in the current economic crisis ‘is that in this decade the region has accumulated large 
gross (non-reserve) assets invested abroad ($180 billion by end-2007); such assets were 
almost non-existent in previous crises. The partial repatriation of those assets during 
2008 helped stabilise the external financial position of the region during the current 
crisis. In 2008, gross outflows decreased by almost $42 billion and net flows amounted 
to $53 billion’. Furthermore, recent evidence suggests that the EDCs’ sovereign wealth 
funds (SWFs) are now more willing to diversify their exposure in advanced economies, 
by moving some funds back home. Such reverse flows by SWFs can also help EDCs to 
ease the impact of temporary capital outflows45. Thus, the acquisition of foreign assets 
through direct (and in many cases portfolio) investments has added one more ‘resilience 
layer’ for the EDCs, helping them to temper adverse capital flows and policies initiated 
in advanced economies. 
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Table 8a 
 
Table 8b 
 
Table 8c 
 
Table 8d 
 
Table 8e 
 
1It includes net portfolio investment, net other investment and net financial derivatives 
Source: IMF Statistics 2015 
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The increased weight of EDCs in global private investment portfolios, as well as the 
change of ‘global markets’ attitude towards EDCs, during the 2000s, are also 
manifested in the willingness of ‘global markets’ (i.e. private investors/creditors) to buy 
long-term debt in developing countries. On the year 2000, investors placed US$ 20.7 
billion in long term debt in developing countries (public, publicly guaranteed, and 
private). This amount had increased to US$ 80.4 billion in 2005, US$ 207.7 billion in 
2008, and US$ 336.5 billion in 201346. Although the absolute numbers do not say 
anything on their own, the substantial increase over time does. The respective picture 
for Brazil, China and India is not uniform but follows a similar pattern. In 2000 only 
Brazil experienced net private investments in its long term debt (US$ 11.1 billion), 
whereas China and India experienced net outflows (US$ 4 and 5 billion respectively). 
Yet, after the outbreak of the global crisis in 2008 private investors significantly 
increased their long term debt purchases in these countries. In the period 2010-2013, 
net private long term debt inflows reached historical heights. The annual average for 
these three years was US$ 52.8 billion in Brazil, 110 billion in China and 16.5 billion 
in India (author’s calculations using World Bank 2015). A strong indication of the way 
in which global markets used large EDCs as a safe alternative even after the 2009 peak 
of the economic crisis in advanced economies. 
 
To conclude, the 2007 Asian financial crisis and its global reverberation triggered a 
significant change in EDCs resilience strategy. This is manifested in EDCs policies of 
primary budget surpluses, foreign reserves accumulation, reduction of external 
exposure and external debt, and changes in global capital flows patterns. In this sense, 
the Asian financial crisis has been a geoeconomic moment for the EDCs and emerging 
powers47.  
 
 
The EDCs’ emergent resilience infrastructure 
 
Despite the above developments (i.e. rebalancing of the global economy and new 
resilience), the main pillar on which the traditional EDCs vulnerability/resilience nexus 
relies has not changed, i.e. the dominant role of the US dollar in global trade and 
finance. The currency composition of external debt liabilities, is a key aspect here. As 
an UNCTAD report48 notes:  
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Focusing on currency composition helps to explain why developing 
countries face frequent debt crises and a country like the United States faces 
no problems sustaining its debt. The difference is not due to where they 
borrow as they both borrow abroad and, on average, developing countries 
borrow abroad less than the United States. They even borrow abroad in the 
same currency as the United States (mostly US dollar); the difference being 
that the United States can print the dollar, whereas developing countries 
cannot.  
 
Here, the problem is that the great majority of the EDCs external debt is denominated 
in currencies, the monetary policy of which they do not control and cannot sufficiently 
influence49. For instance, in 2013, on average, 64.2% of the public debt of developing 
countries was denominated in US dollars (from 60.1% in 2007). The respective regional 
figures were 64.8% in East Asia and the Pacific, 68.1% in South Asia, and 74.3% in 
Latin America and the Caribbean50. This demonstrates not only  the dominant position 
of US dollar in the global political economy of debt, but also the direct way in which 
monetary policy in the US impacts on the economy and debt sustainability of countries 
around the world. Vulnerability here relates to both the public and private sector. The 
Russian economic crisis in 2014/15, when the ruble collapsed against the dollar, is 
indicative. Russia’s public external debt denominated in dollars, was very low at US$ 
27.7 billion (overall public external debt was also low, at US$ 64 billion)51. Yet, in 
contrast to the public sector, the private sector was more exposed to the US dollar. 
Russian banks were holding dollar denominated liabilities of US$ 132.5 billion and the 
‘other private sector’ was holding liabilities of US$267.1 billion. Therefore, the Russian 
government had to step in and take a number of measures aiming to provide the needed 
liquidity in dollars to the private sector, so as to prevent a domino of defaults that would 
eventually engulf the public sector, the sovereign itself. We find a similar exposure to 
the dollar in the great majority of large EDCs. Indicatively, in the last quarter of 2014, 
US dollar denominated claims as a share of cross-border claims was 78% in Brazil, 
74% in India, and slightly above 60% in Russia, Korea and Mexico. Only in China it 
was significantly lower at 39%, from 54% in 200852; a result of its strategy to reduce 
its exposure to dollar (see below).   
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Despite the dollar’s dominant role today, it would be a mistake to reduce our reading 
of the global economy and the EDCs vulnerability/resilience nexus to the dominance 
of the dollar. In contrast, we should examine how the EDCs deal with this traditional 
source of vulnerability and whether their current responses are able to generate broader 
changes. In this context, a new wave of currency swap agreements (CSAs) among 
EDCs should not be underestimated. These agreements enhance the EDCs resilience by 
strengthening their foreign currency liquidity, and therefore their capacity to deal with 
crises related to their balance of payments, currency, or foreign debt. In addition, by 
facilitating the settlement of cross-border trade and investments in local currencies 
these agreements offer an alternative to the use of US dollar in international trade and 
finance. 
 
Lessons from the recent economic history suggest caution. The non-utilization of the 
Chiang Mai Initiative in East Asia, as well as the failure of a number of bilateral CSAs 
in the past, e.g. between Brazil and Argentina, have cast a negative shadow to the ability 
of CSAs to deliver concrete policy results. Yet, the new global economic environment 
(defined by the increased weight of China), the high number of the current agreements 
in place and under negotiation, as well as some early findings on their impact, suggest 
that the effect of this new wave of CSAs on the EDCs resilience should not be ignored53. 
At the centre of these new dynamics is China. As part of its strategy to internationalize 
the renminbi, China has by far the most extended network of bilateral currency swap 
agreements54. Since 2009 the People’s Bank of China (PBC) has negotiated 29 bilateral 
currency swap agreements, which together amount to ¥2.7 trillion renminbi (approx. 
500 billion US$). Most of these agreements have a 3-year duration and several have 
been extended, with an increase in the original amount agreed (Table 9). In 2014 the 
active credit line of all Chinese bilateral CSAs was at 1.1 trillion renminbi55. 
Furthermore, in 2011 China allowed for a first time designated banks to launch cross-
currency swap operations for their private customers.   
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TABLE 9 
 
Source: Liao and Mcdowell (2014); Destais (2014); People’s Bank of China; 
Financial Times 
 
Beyond the nominal amounts involved, the difference with the past is that these CSAs 
are gradually, if modestly, used. For instance, in 2014 the amount of renminbi actually 
used was 38 billion (approx. US$ 1 billion), and at the end of 2014 there was a CSA-
related outstanding amount of 15.8 billion renminbi56. Furthermore, these agreements 
have been used as part of a broader strategy of facilitating cross-border trade and 
investments in renminbi / local currencies (e.g. reals, rupees, rubles, rands etc). If 
successful, this strategy will reduce the exposure/vulnerability of the involved parts to 
the US dollar, and gradually reduce the all-dominant role of dollar in the global 
economy. China formally inaugurated its policy to establish renminbi as a pricing and 
settlement currency in July 2009, when it introduced a pilot scheme for renminbi trade 
settlements. The impact that this strategy had on the first four years of its 
implementation was impressive (see Table 10). The use of renminbi for settlements in 
‘trade in goods’ increased from close-to-nothing in July 2009 to ¥3.02 trillion in 2013, 
accounting for 11.7 percent of the total value of Chinese trade in goods (import and 
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
180
200
220
240
260
280
300
320
340
360
380
400
H
o
n
g
 K
o
n
g
K
o
re
a
E
C
B
A
u
st
ra
li
a
U
n
it
ed
 K
in
g
d
o
m
B
ra
zi
l
M
al
ay
si
a
S
in
g
ap
o
re
S
w
it
ze
rl
an
d
R
u
ss
ia
T
h
ai
la
n
d
A
rg
en
ti
n
a
U
.A
.E
.
N
ew
 Z
ea
la
n
d
In
d
o
n
es
ia
Ja
p
an
B
el
ar
u
s
U
k
ra
in
e
S
ri
 L
an
k
a
M
o
n
g
o
li
a
P
ak
is
ta
n
H
u
n
g
ar
y
K
az
ak
h
st
an
Ic
el
an
d
A
lb
an
ia
T
u
rk
ey
S
u
ri
n
am
e
U
zb
ek
is
ta
n
Chinese CSA in 2014
billion renminbi
 20 
 
export), while these settlements involved companies from 174 different countries. 
Respectively, renminbi settlements in ‘trade in services and other current account 
items’ from close-to-nothing in 2009 reached ¥1.6 trillion in 2013. Thus, in 2013 
renminbi denominated overall cross-border trade settlements reached ¥4.6 trillion (US$ 
750 billion). Respectively, FDI-related settlements reached ¥533.7 billion (US$ 84 
billion) in 2014, having almost double in comparison to the year before57. Thus, 
renminbi from place 20 in the ranking of global trade payment currencies in 2012, was 
between places 7 and 9 in 2014. The same year it emerged as the second most used 
currency in trade finance58. This trend is enhanced by a number of new arrangements 
that aim at fostering the international availability and convertibility of renminbi59, 
including the shift towards a more market-based (but still managed) exchange rate 
regime60, the introduction of a new cross-border interbank payment system61, specific 
programmes that aim to facilitate foreign investments in China’s capital markets (e.g. 
the Qualified Foreign Institutional Investor programme - QFII, and the respective 
Renminbi QFII), the issuance of renminbi denominated bonds in international markets, 
and the objective of achieving the inclusion of the renminbi in the basket of currencies 
that are used by the IMF in the valuation of its Special Drawing Rights (thus fostering 
the renminbi’s role as a global reserve currency)62. For instance, from 2014 the parity 
between the renminbi and the sterling is determined by average market day transactions 
between the two currencies and not through the US$ as used to be the case until then; 
also, there is direct trading in the interbank market between renminbi and some foreign 
currencies (e.g. New Zealand dollar). The same year the UK was the first western 
government to issue renminbi denominated bonds63. Furthermore, easing its interbank 
exchange rate policy, the People’s Bank of China (PBC) allowed for a first time banks 
to set exchange rate quotes for their clients on the basis of market demand, and not 
within a 4% band against average day rates against the US dollar. Considering, 
however, the place of China in global economy, renminbi is still heavily underutilised 
in global trade and investments64. 
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TABLE 10 
 
Source: The People's Bank of China, 2014 
 
China is not the only emerging power that attempts to increase the use of its currency 
in trade and investment settlements. For instance, Brazil has also signed CSAs, most 
significantly with Argentina in 2008 (US$1.8 billion)65 and with China in 2013 (US$ 
30 billion)66. Furthermore, India has adopted a regional CSA strategy in South Asia. In 
a SAARC Finance meeting, in 2012, it was agreed that the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) 
would offer swap facilities to SAARC countries (Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, 
Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka) up to US$ 2 billion (both in foreign currency 
and Indian rupee)67. The same year the RBI signed a CSA with the Bank of Japan (BOJ) 
for US$15 billion, which was renewed and expanded to US$ 50 billion in 2014. RBI 
also signed a new bilateral CSA with Sri Lanka for US$ 400 million in March 2015, 
with the Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi stating that the purpose of this 
agreement was to ‘help keep the Sri Lankan rupee stable’68. Overall, India has 
concluded CSAs with more than 25 countries, in most cases prioritising countries with 
which it runs a current account deficit. It is worth mentioning that in the case of India’s 
relations with Iran, 45% of payments for oil imports in 2013 were made in rupees, and 
credited to an UCO Bank account in Kolkata. The balance was then made available in 
euros in Turkey69.  
 
These bilateral CSAs can also be used by emerging powers as an instrument of 
economic statecraft and geopolitical (re)configuration. The recent CSA between China 
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and Russia is indicative here. It was signed in October 2014 and established a swap 
limit of 150 billion renminbi (approx. US$ 25 billion). The agreement took place in a 
highly adverse international context for Russia, characterised by economic sanctions, 
increased international isolation (due to the annexation of Crimea), and a developing 
domestic financial crisis70. Although, the credit lines established were not sufficient to 
make a difference in stabilising the Russian financial sector and the ruble, or to act as a 
safety belt for the Russian economy, the agreement was important in many different 
ways. It offered an alternative to Russia against its isolation from the West, it brought 
the central banks of the two countries closer together institutionalising their currency 
swap cooperation, it gave to Russian companies space to decrease their dependency on 
the dollar in their new trade transactions, and most importantly it created a de-
dollarisation dynamic in the cross-border trade and investment relations (including the 
energy sector) of two systemically important global economies; a development that has 
the capacity to have an impact on the global role of dollar as an exchange and reserve 
currency (even if this impact cannot challenge its  dominant role). Equally important 
are the broader bilateral economic dynamics that this agreement has set off. For 
instance, Russian oil exports to China were increased by 36 percent in 2014, replacing 
other oil exporters such as Saudi Arabia71. Furthermore, the ruble was one of three 
currencies for which China launched a swap and forward contracts trade, in December 
2014. In 2014 the total trade in renminbi on the Moscow Stock Exchange increased 
eight times, reaching 395 billion rubles (48 billion yuan)72. In this context, it is worth 
mentioning that Russia and India have also set as their target and are currently 
negotiating the terms of using their national currencies in bilateral trade settlements, 
with a deal expected to take place in 201673. 
 
Of course, this new CSA net is not devoid of power relations. For the great majority of 
EDCs, it does not signify a shift away from relations of power and dependency in the 
global economy, but rather a complex and slowly moving game of displacement and 
reordering of these power relations. In this way it will create new imbalances and 
dependencies in their current and capital accounts. But by creating (more) options for 
weaker EDCs, it increases their resilience capacity, and by doing so it creates new 
policy space for them which was not there before.  
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The example of the swap agreement between China and Argentina is indicative of such 
tensions and dynamics. The CSA agreement was signed in 2014 and worth US$ 11 
billion (it replaced a previous inactive bilateral CSA which was signed in 2009 and 
expired in 2012)74. In the context of this agreement the Central Bank of Argentina 
(BCRA) could request up to 70 billion renminbi in exchange for pesos to use them for 
imports or inward investments from China, or to exchange them for US dollars (or other 
foreign currencies) to boost its foreign reserves (i.e. its ability to defend the peso and/or 
deal with dollar shortages in relation to its external position). In the context of the July 
2014 new default crisis in Argentina, and the country’s stand-off with vulture funds, 
this new CSA was extensively used. By January 2015 Argentina had received in four 
instalments US$ 2.7 billion that allowed the country to stabilise its falling foreign 
reserves. At the same time, it was agreed that Chinese companies will take over a 
number of ‘strategic investments’ in infrastructure in Argentina, including the 
construction of US$4.7 billion hydroelectric project and the construction of a nuclear 
plant75. Yet, in this process of strengthening Sino-Argentinian relations, Argentina’s 
current account surplus with China became a deficit of US$5 billion in 201476.  
 
Based on the above analysis, it can be argued that the emergent network of currency 
swaps agreements among EDCs, and the broader dynamics that this network creates, 
increase both the resilience of EDCs to adverse external shocks and, at least in the case 
of emerging powers, their capacity to resist pressures emanating from advanced 
economies.    
 
Beyond however the bilateral level, there is also a wide range of new plurilateral CSA 
arrangements among the EDCs77. For instance, in their July 2014 meeting in Fortaleza 
the BRICS established a US$100 billion BRICS Contingent Reserve Arrangement 
(CRA). Article 1 of the CRA’s founding treaty notes: ‘The CRA is a framework for the 
provision of support through liquidity and precautionary instruments in response to 
actual or potential short-term balance of payments pressures’. Interestingly, the CRA 
follows the Chiang Mai model by linking funding above a certain threshold with IMF 
conditionality—the so called ‘IMF-link’ clause78. Thus, if any of the participating 
members requests more than 30% of its maximum quota, then funding is subject to 
‘evidence of an on-track arrangement between the IMF and the Requesting Party that 
involves a commitment of the IMF to provide financing to the Requesting Party based 
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on conditionality’ (article 5). In this way, although the 30% ‘de-linked portion’ of the 
CRA can be thought of as a flexible line outside the ‘structural adjustment’ framework 
of the IMF, the 70% ‘IMF-linked portion’ should be understood as a BRICS driven and 
controlled extension of the existing IMF's funding instruments (mostly the 
‘Precautionary and Liquidity Line’ and ‘Flexible Credit Line’)79.  
 
In addition to the CRA initiative, there are a number of other plurilateral frameworks 
that have recently been concluded or are currently under negotiation, and aim to 
function either as backline liquidity support mechanisms, in the event of financial or 
currency crises (along the lines of the IMF), or as frontline development investment 
mechanisms (along the lines of the World Bank), or both. Two important regional 
initiatives in the backline liquidity support category are the updated Chiang Mai 
Initiative Multilateralisation (CMIM) in East Asia, and the Anti-Crisis Fund (ACF) of 
the Eurasian Economic Community (EurAsEC). The CMIM entered in force in 2014 
and includes a currency swap arrangement with a total capacity of US$240 billion (i.e. 
double the original Chiang Mai Initiative amount). The updated agreement includes a 
new crisis prevention facility, the CMIM Precautionary Line, that makes easier the 
provision of short-term emergency liquidity funding, and increases the ‘de-linked 
portion’ (i.e. funding that does not require IMF conditionality) from 20 to 30% 80. The 
EurAsEC Anti-Crisis Fund, led by Russia, was established in 2009, and has a capacity 
of US$ 8.5 billion. Its main aim is to support stabilisation / anti-crisis programs in 
EurAsEc members, but also includes funding for large investment projects81. 
Respectively, recent initiatives focusing on development funding, and especially large 
investments in infrastructure, include the BRICS-led ‘New Development Bank - NDB’ 
(2014, US$100 billion)82, the ‘China Silk Road Fund’ (2014, US$10 billion)83 and the 
China-led, ‘Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank - AIIB’ (2015, US$100 billion)84.  
 
Any detailed analysis of the above initiatives is beyond our purpose here. Yet, the main 
point is that along with the emergent network of bilateral CSAs, there is also an 
expanding network of new plurilateral funding arrangements and institutions, mostly 
driven by BRIC countries. Although their capacity is rather limited, these initiatives 
make further resources available to EDCs (both outside and in conjunction with the 
traditional Bretton Wood system), thus enhancing the ability of emerging and 
developing countries to respond to economic crises and pressures emanating from the 
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advanced economies. As mentioned above, these new arrangements are not foreign to 
national interests, biases and power relations. Rather the opposite. If successful, they 
will generate and consolidate their own (‘non Western’) bias and power relationships. 
Yet, these developments clearly increase the policy space and alternatives available to 
the emerging and developing countries.   
 
 
‘New resilience’ and Emerging Powers in the Context of US Monetary 
Tightening  
 
Can this new policy space and degrees of freedom survive in a post-crisis global 
economy defined by monetary tightening in the US? The historical record points to a 
negative answer. Increases in US interest rates in the past triggered capital flight, and 
waves of banking and currency crises and sovereign defaults in EDCs. To assess the 
EDCs vulnerability in these terms we need to place them in the historical context in 
which it occurs. As argued above, the EDCs’ increased contribution to global GDP 
creates an economic environment in which the economic sustainability of advanced and 
emerging economies are causally related. In this context, and considering the fragile 
recovery process in advanced economies, rather than an outright outflow, the capital 
flow pattern that is most likely to persist in the new US monetary tightening global 
context is that of ‘destabilising volatility’, i.e. waves of abrupt outflows will be 
followed by respectively abrupt inflows85. We have already experience this pattern with 
abrupt outflows in 2008, 2012, 2015, followed by equally abrupt inflows in 2009-2010 
and 201386. There are two main reasons for this volatile capital flow pattern. First, due 
to the increased resilience and the emergent resilience infrastructure that we developed 
above, an abrupt collapse of the EDCs, similar to that experienced in the Asian crisis in 
1997/98, is highly unlikely. Second, due to the fact that the advanced economies are 
not in a position to offer a solid alternative to emerging markets for private investment 
portfolios. Thus, although, investors in ‘risk-adverse moments’ retreat to the core (i.e. 
advanced economies), the risk and cost of doing so in the current juncture are too high.  
 
It is not only that the majority of the advanced economies remain in rather uncharted 
waters, due to growing levels of debt, lack of effective deleveraging, and the unknown 
long term impact of QE policies87. It is also that the actual cost of a ‘retreat to the core’ 
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is rather unpredictable and high. The recent evidence of negative-yielding bonds is 
revealing. In the Eurozone the volume of negative-yielding bonds was estimated in 
January 2015 to be €1.2tn (a quarter of all outstanding Eurozone sovereign debt), up 
from €500bn in October 2014 and no negative-yielding bonds in June 201488. These 
negative-yielding assets are not only a product of secondary trading. A number of 
countries of different risk premia (e.g. Germany, Finland, Spain, Ireland) sold short-
term debt at negative yields in 2014, whereas Switzerland was the first country (in 
economic history!) to sell 10-year bonds at negative yields in April 201589. No matter 
whether these developments is an indication of deflation expectation in Europe or a 
short-term strategy aiming at capitalising on the QE programme of the ECB, or both, it 
is a good example of the unconventional and uncertain moment that markets and yields 
go through in many advanced economies.  
 
Yet, as mentioned in the beginning of this paper, increased resilience does not mean 
that the EDCs do not remain vulnerable to changes in advanced economies, and in 
particular a raise in US interest rates90. A prolonged period of uncertainty, and abrupt 
short term capital flows have the ability to undermine the EDCs’ hard won resilience. 
Our analysis however indicates that changes have occurred with regard to the 
implications of this EDCs vulnerability. Considering the systemically important nature 
of the emerging powers’ economies and the interlocking nature of the EDCs and 
advanced economies, this traditional problem/vulnerability of the EDCs is now a 
problem/vulnerability for the global economy as a whole. For, a new 1990s-like series 
of economic crises in emerging powers is bound to reverse the fragile recovery in 
advanced economies, in a period that the latter remain in uncharted waters and exposed 
in terms of debt and leverage. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Emerging and developing countries demonstrated unexpected resilience in the face of 
2008/09 global economic crisis. To understand what this resilience means for the global 
economy and its transformation, the paper attempted to shift the focus from the 
structural constrained faced by the EDCs, to the EDCs agency, and a number of 
dispersed initiatives that are currently taking place on the ground. This analysis made 
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clear that there is a new, BRIC-led resilience infrastructure under construction that 
increases the EDCs leverage and degrees of freedom in the global economy, but also in 
the realm of foreign policy. Focusing on how this resilience infrastructure develops and 
sets in motion de-dollarization dynamics is now critical for understanding the 
conditions of transformation of global economy.  
 
It is also critical that these changes and challenges take place in conditions of systemic 
interlocking between the EDCs and advanced economies. Considering the systemically 
important nature of the economies of emerging powers, and the interlocking nature of 
the EDCs and advanced economies, any major crisis in the emerging powers will have 
a global impact and engulf the advanced economies. This context together with the 
emergent EDCs resilience infrastructure not only increase the leverage of emerging 
powers, but as mentioned above change the very structure in which the EDCs 
vulnerability/resilience nexus operated in the post-WWII order. Of course, different 
EDCs are affected differently by these developments. For the great majority of EDCs 
these developments are mostly translated into more ‘options’ for ‘dependency’ in their 
economic and foreign policy, rather than resilience capacity. But these ‘more options’ 
create new policy space even for the weaker EDCs. And this new policy space creates 
room for agency and change which was not there before.    
 
The anticipated US monetary tightening and the currently experienced heightened 
volatility in short term capital flows put at new stress the emerging and developing 
powers and their new resilience. Although, an abrupt collapse of the EDCs, similar to 
that experienced in the Asian crisis in 1997/98, is highly unlikely, exactly due to the 
EDCs new resilience and related arrangements, a new series of EDCs economic crises 
cannot be excluded. A number of factors complicate further the current economic 
juncture. For instance, increased geopolitical uncertainty (especially in relation to the 
Ukrainian crisis and Russia, the role of ISIS and instability in the Middle East), new 
geopolitical dynamics (e.g. the rapprochement of Russia and China),  as well as 
heightened competition between the US and China (for instance with regard to the US-
driven Transpacific Partnership, and the China-driven Regional Comprehensive 
Economic Partnership; the US initial stance towards the China-driven AIIB initiative; 
tensions in the South China sea).  
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All these factors, but above all a series of new economic crises in the emerging and 
developing world, have the potential to act as a new geoeconomic moment for emerging 
powers. We discussed above how the 1990s financial crises functioned as a 
geoeconomic moment that forced emerging powers to change their mode of integration 
in the global economy, redefining the EDCs traditional vulnerability/resilience nexus. 
A new major economic crisis engulfing the EDCs today could act as a respective 
geoeconomic moment, creating a new rift in the global economy. This possibility, by 
its very existence, defines a new global geoeconomic chessboard. For, such a crisis 
would force the emerging powers to openly challenge the dominant role of the US 
currency and the legitimacy of the Bretton Woods global economic architecture. No 
country or group of countries currently seems willing to take such a risk. This reinforces 
our conclusion that emerging powers and advanced economies are mutually bounded, 
at least in the context of the current global economic paradigm. It also reflects the 
constrained policy space available to the advanced economies in the new global 
economic chessboard.   
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